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A TAXONOMY OF OBESITY LITIGATION
Theodore H. Frank*
I. INTRODUCTION
I come to the topic of obesity litigation from the unique perspective of
an obese litigator. In my case, the causes of my obesity are genetics, spend-
ing too much time litigating and not enough time exercising, and, probably,
my grandmother's recipes.' This analysis may seem flippant, but the indi-
vidualized circumstances of my obesity highlight a fundamental problem
with the use of class action litigation to address obesity. Class action litiga-
tion is a procedural device to aggregate claims where common issues pre-
dominate.2 The causes of any one person's obesity, however, will be highly
individualized--different genetics, different exercise patterns, different eat-
ing patterns, and different choices. 3 Only through abuse of the class action
mechanism can litigation be feasibly used by plaintiffs' attorneys. The risk
of that abuse, however, is very real.
In 2000, the very idea of lawsuits over obesity was the subject of par-
ody in The Onion in a piece satirizing recent tobacco litigation successes.4
Less than two years later, a concerted entrepreneurial effort emerged to du-
plicate the fruits of the tobacco litigation, namely, the billions of dollars
extracted by attorneys from the tobacco industry and tobacco users.5
* Resident Fellow and Director of the AEI Liability Project, American Enterprise
Institute. Portions of this paper were originally presented at a conference organized by the
American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research in March 2005. My thanks to Mi-
chael Greve, Philip Wallach, Dan Greenberg, and Amber Taylor for their comments on ear-
lier drafts; to Philip Wallach for his able research assistance; and to the AEI Liability Project
for its support.
1. Cf JOHANNA HURWITZ, ONCE I WAS A PLUM TREE (William Morrow Junior Books
& Co., 1980) (detailing a fictionalized account of growing up with my grandmother).
2. FED. R. CIv. PROC. 23(b)(3). Richard A. Epstein, Class Actions: Aggregation, Am-
plification and Distortion, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 475, 475 (2003). See also In re Bridge-
stone/Firestone Tire Prod. Liab. Litig., 288 F.3d 1012, 1019-20 (7th Cir. 2002).
3. NATIONAL HEART, LUNG, AND BLOOD INSTITUTE, CLINICAL GUIDELINES ON THE
IDENTIFICATION, EVALUATION, AND TREATMENT OF OVERWEIGHT AND OBESITY IN ADULTS, at
xi (1998) ("Obesity is a complex multifactoral chronic disease developing from interactive
influences of numerous factors-social behavioral, physiological, metabolic, cellular, and
molecular in addition to cultural and genetic factors"); The Surgeon General's Call to Action
to Prevent and Decrease Overweight and Obesity, 1 (2001) ("Overweight and obesity are
caused by many factors. For each individual, body weight is determined by a combination of
genetic metabolic, behavioral, environmental, cultural, and socioeconomic influences.").
4. Hershey's Ordered To Pay Obese Americans $135 Billion, THE ONION, Aug. 2,
2000, available at http://www.theonion.com/content/index/3626 (last visited Apr. 28, 2006).
5. See, e.g., Walter K. Olson, Taking Cola to Court, 16 CITY JOURNAL 9-10 (Winter
2006).
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It is well understood that the United States is getting fatter and that
obesity and morbid obesity are on the increase. 6 The issue is not new: a No-
vember 1961 Atlantic Monthy article was titled "We May Be Sitting Our-
selves to Death.",7 The problem rose higher on the public policy agenda
when the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) announced in 2004 that obe-
sity was responsible for an additional 400,000 American deaths a year.8 A
CDC researcher has since released a study showing the real figure to be a
fifteenth of that size,9 but the lower number has not deterred some attorneys
from seeking to make obesity litigation "the next tobacco."' 0
Just as doctors engage in defensive medicine," fast-food chains have
engaged in defensive restauranting by cluttering their menus with McLean
Deluxe sandwiches (McDonald's), 12 Border Light tacos (Taco Bell), 13 and
low-fat baguette sandwiches (Burger King).' 4 These healthy options, how-
ever, are routinely ignored by customers, at costs of millions to corporate
shareholders in wasted advertising dollars and development costs. 15 Funda-
6. See UNITED STATES DEP'T. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., 2002 CHARTBOOK ON
TRENDS IN THE HEALTH OF AMERICANS (2002), available at
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/hus/hus20cht.pdf (last visited Apr. 28, 2006).
7. Frank R. Neu, We May Be Sitting Ourselves to Death, ATLANTIC MONTHLY (Nov.
1961), available at http://www.theatlantic.com/issues/61nov/neu.htm (last visited Apr. 28,
2006).
8. Ali H. Mokdad, et al., Actual Causes of Death in the United States, 291 JAMA
1238-45 (Mar. 10, 2004), available at http://jama.ama-
assn.org/cgi/content/abstract/291/10/1238. (last visited Apr. 28, 2006).
9. Katherine M. Flegal, et al., Excess Deaths Associated With Underweight, Over-
weight, and Obesity, 293 JAMA 1861 (Apr. 23, 2005), available at http://jama.ama-
assn.org/cgi/content/abstract/293/15/1861 (last visited Apr. 28, 2006).
10. Roger Parloff, "Is Fat the Next Tobacco?" FORTUNE Jan. 21, 2003 at 50; Melanie
Warner, The Food Industry Empire Strikes Back, N.Y. TIMES Jul. 7, 2005.
11. Defensive medicine is the practice of unnecessary and costly procedures meant to
protect oneself from future litigation. See, e.g., Daniel Kessler & Mark McClellan, Do Doc-
tors Practice Defensive Medicine?, THE QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS 353-90 (May
1996).
12. Wally Bock, McDonald's: When the Passion is Gone, the Profits are Over,
MONDAY MEMO (Mar. 17, 2003), available at
http://www.mondaymemo.net/030317feature.htm (last visited Apr. 28, 2006) (explaining the
place of the McLean in McDonald's corporate history).
13. Louise Kramer, Taco Bell Lightens Up on Border Lights, NATION'S RESTAURANT
NEWS (Mar. 11, 1996), available at
http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mim3190/is-nlOv30/ai_18101385 (last visited Apr.
28, 2006) (recounting the rise and fall of several low-fat offerings at fast food restaurants,
including Taco Bell's).
14. Ken Hoffman, Even Burger-King Goes Low-Fat, KING FEATURES SYNDICATE (Oct.
18, 2003), available at http://www.spcnetwork.com/mii/2003/031034.htm (last visited Apr.
28, 2006).
15. Even Subway, which generally tries to position itself in the fast-food market as a
healthier option than its competitors, has recently given in to consumer preference and
started making a pitch for a cheese-and-sauce-laden-fried-patty chicken parmesan sandwich.
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mental flaws in modem-day tort litigation combined with the risk of
changes in the legal landscape decades down the line suggest that, while
such defensive maneuvering may be economically inefficient, it may also be
legally prudent.
The plaintiffs' bar and media have claimed early "success" in obesity
and lifestyle litigation;' 6 however, several fundamentally different kinds of
lawsuits are being grouped under one "obesity litigation" umbrella, and
each one has different policy implications for obesity and for the legal sys-
tem. A closer look shows that the plaintiffs' successes have been thin gruel
and that the obesity litigation to date has been much more successful in
transferring wealth to attorneys than in advancing legitimate public policy
concerns.
A. The Seinfeld Yogurt Shop Lawsuits
In the 1993 Seinfeld episode "The Non-Fat Yogurt,"' 17 Kramer invests
in a store that sells a popular, tasty frozen yogurt that is advertised as non-
fat.' 8 Seinfeld and Elaine become suspicious when they gain weight. When
they eventually test the yogurt, it turns out to contain fat, and humorous
complications ensue. 19
At least two lawsuits classified as "obesity lawsuits" actually involve
this sort of run-of-the-mill affirmative misrepresentation: a falsifiable claim
involving calories, fat grams, or carbohydrates is simply false. In Florida,
DeConna Ice Cream labeled its "Big Daddy" ice cream as having 100 calo-
ries, two grams of fat, and nineteen grams of carbohydrates per serving.2 In
fact, the product had triple the fat claimed.21 When the South Florida Sun-
Sentinel uncovered the discrepancy, DeConna blamed it on a database error
and changed the label. 22 Then, a class action suit, free-riding off of the dis-
closure, ensued.23
David Kiley, Product Placement Appears in More Scripted Venues, BuSINESS WEEK ONLINE
(Sept. 29, 2005), available at
http://www.businessweek.com/the-thread/brandnewday/archieves/2005/09/product-placeme
nt.html?campaignid=search (last visited Apr. 28, 2006) (describing how the advertising
campaign for new sandwich was started with an appearance on NBC's "Will and Grace").
16. E.g., Laura Parker, Legal Experts Predict New Rounds in Food Fight, USA TODAY,
May 7, 2004, at 3A. ("There have been eight 'fat' lawsuits. Five of them were at least par-
tially successful.") Id.
17. Seinfeld: The Non-Fat Yogurt (NBC television broadcast, Nov. 4, 1993).
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. DeConna Settles Big Daddy Suits, 16 ICE CREAM REPORTER 3 (Oct. 20, 2003).
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
2006]
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Similarly, in December 2001, the Good Housekeeping Institute discov-
ered that "Pirate's Booty," a puffed-rice snack, understated its calories and
fat content.24 Robert's American Gourmet Foods, the manufacturer, blamed
it on a manufacturing error and immediately recalled the product.25 Again,
attorneys filed a free-riding class action, and the company quietly settled for
a nuisance sum.
26
While activists like John Banzhaf trumpeted these cases as examples of
successful obesity lawsuits,27 it is hard to see how these lawsuits have any
public policy implications beyond highlighting the problem with rent-
seeking class action attorneys who receive millions of dollars for little effort
or benefit to their clients. Whatever the cause of the nation's obesity prob-
lem, mislabeled food is a slim to infinitesimal proportion of it. In both
cases, the correction in labeling came from existing market institutions, with
lawyers getting involved only after the problem was admitted by the defen-
dants.28 The "Big Daddy" case is an especially poor example of a litigation
solution to the obesity problem because while customers with receipts re-
ceived refunds, those without receipts who filled out claim forms received
coupons for free ice cream. 29 Similarly, the proposed Pirate's Booty settle-
ment offered only coupons for the fattening products.3 °
B. The Pinprick Suits
1. The Trans-Fat Suits
There have been a few minor "obesity suits" filed by public interest
firms that coincided with action that a defendant was inclined to take any-
way. Activist Steven Joseph sued Kraft and McDonald's over trans fatty
acids (or "trans fats") in their foods. In the Kraft case, Steven Joseph sought
24. Bob Condor, Lawyer Tweaks Food Industry For Obesity Trend, CHICAGO TRIBUNE,
May 18, 2003, at C9.
25. Id.
26. Id. A state appeals court in Brooklyn recently reversed the trial court's 2002 ap-
proval of this settlement on the grounds that the plaintiffs' attorneys had failed to justify their
proposed $789,000 in fees for the $3.5 million-in-discount-coupon settlement. Klein v.
Robert's American Gourmet Food, Inc., 808 N.Y.S.2d 766 (N.Y. App. Div. 2006); Tom
Perrotta, Court Panel Rejects Class Settlement and Attorney Fees in Suit Over Nutrition
Data, 235 N.Y.L.J. 1 (Feb. 6, 2006).
27. Andrew Gumbel, An Appetite for Litigation: The US Lawyer John Banzhaf Was the
First to Sue the Tobacco Companies in the Mid-Sixties. But Now He Wants to Prosecute the
Junk-Food Industry for Making Americans Obese. Has He Bitten Off More Than He Can
Chew?, INDEPENDENT (London), June 4, 2002, at 4-6.
28. See supra, notes 20-26 and accompanying text.
29. De Conna, supra note 20, at 3.
30. Klein, 808 N.Y.S.2d at 769.
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an injunction from the use of trans fats in Oreos sold to children. 31 Kraft
instantly agreed to reduce or eliminate trans fat from their products.
McDonald's had previously announced that it would switch to a lower-
trans-fat cooking oil by February 2003 but had operational issues preventing
the switch. 32 As a result, McDonald's was sued for allegedly failing to no-
tify the public that the switch had not taken place.33 McDonald's agreed to
pay $8.5 million dollars with some of the money going to the American
Heart Association and the rest paying for advertising that notified consum-
ers of the failure to switch, plus plaintiffs' attorneys' fees.34
It is unclear to what extent Kraft's response was driven by the lawsuit
or driven by market pressure caused by the combination of increasing public
awareness of the newly understood dangers of partially hydrogenated oils
and of the FDA's expected change in labeling regulations that would require
the identification of trans fat content.35 The publicity from the suits likely
had more effect than the suits themselves given that Kraft announced its
plans the day after the suit was filed.36 The new Oreo products are indeed
heart-healthier, given their successful elimination of partially hydrogenated
oils; however, they contain the same number of calories.37 Therefore, the
new Oreo products are unlikely to affect obesity.
Similarly, McDonald's settlement transferred a charitable donation it
would have likely made anyway to the ledger of class action settlement.38
McDonald's was already going to change its cooking oil as soon as it cre-
ated a commercially feasible alternative, so the lawsuit did not change
this. 39 Any new cooking oil will have less or no trans fat, but will not have
31. Kim Severson, S.F. Lawyer Plans To Drop Oreo Suit, THE SAN FRANCISCO
CHRONICLE, May 15, 2003, at A3.
32. Steven Joseph, Plaintiff's Press Release on Settlement of McDonald's Trans Fat
Litigation (Feb. 11, 2005), available at http://www.bantransfats.com/mcdonalds.html (last
visited Apr. 28, 2006).
33. Id.
34. Id.; Joe Garofoli, $7 Million for Suit on Trans Fats McDonald's To Pay Heart Asso-
ciation, SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, Feb. 12, 2005 at A2.
35. 68 Fed. Reg. 41433 (Jul. 11, 2003) (implementing Nov. 17, 1999, proposed rule
from 64 Fed. Reg. 62746 at 21 C.F.R. 101.9(c)(2)(ii)).
36. Severson, supra note 31, at A3.
37. Oreos Stacking Up, WASHINGTON POST, Feb. 22, 2006, at F4.
38. For example, on February 1, 2006, McDonald's announced the donation of $50
million to Ronald McDonald House Charities. Press Release, McDonald's Corporation,
McD's Reaches Goal to Raise $50 Million for Children of the World in Honor of its 50th
Anniversary (Feb. 1, 2006). In September 2005, McDonald's donated $5 million in cash and
millions of dollars in products for Hurricane Katrina relief. Press Release McDonald's Cor-
poration, McDonald's Announces Additional Support for Disaster Relief (Sept. 10, 2005).
39. Press Release, McDonald's Corporation, McDonald's TFA Settlement Announce-
ment, Feb. 9, 2005, available at
http://www.mcdonalds.com/corp/news/corppr/2005/cpr_02092005.printfriend.html (last
visited Apr. 28, 2006) (noting that the company "continues to work hard on our initiative to
2006]
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fewer calories. 4 0 Again, this litigation will have no effect on obesity; there-
fore, its primary effect is the wealth transfer to attorneys.
2. The Vegetarian Suits
Coincidentally, the McDonald's shift to partially hydrogenated vegeta-
ble oil was in response to previous activism asking it to end the use of beef
tallow in making French fries. 41 That shift was later the subject of another
so-called "obesity lawsuit. ' 42 Hindus and vegetarians sued McDonald's for
consumer fraud for identifying its French fries as vegetarian when, in fact, a
minuscule amount of beef tallow was used to blanch the fries. 3 McDonald's
apologized and paid $10 million to charity.44 Public relations alone would
dictate such a move. There is no reason to believe the lawsuit had any effect
on obesity.
3. The School-Board Suits
Threatened lawsuits against school boards to ban the sale of soft drinks
in schools have had success. Rather than fight the litigation, school boards
usually agree to changes that satisfy the attorneys. But this is part of a larger
trend against soft drinks in schools; therefore, it cannot be entirely credited
to activist litigation. Chicago unilaterally chose to end its working relation-
ship with Coca-Cola, as did Los Angeles, San Francisco, and Nashville. 5 In
addition, the states of Maine and Texas have banned soda and junk food
from their schools statewide.46 The lawsuit threats thus may well have been
superfluous. Indeed, four school-board members in Seattle successfully
campaigned on an anti-junk-food platform. 7 As of 2005, according to the
School Nutrition Association, two-thirds of United States schools have lim-
reduce TFAs in our cooking oil").
40. See Kim Severson & Melanie Warner, Fat Substitute, Once Praised, is Pushed Out
of Kitchen, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 2005, §1 at 5 (recounting of how trans fat's rise and fall
were both due to public health activists; discussing current substitutes' shortcomings).
41. Id.
42. Lynn Thompson, Latest Beef Over Fries Who Gets The Money, SEATTLE TIMES,
Aug. 4, 2002, at Al.
43. Id.
44. Id. While deciding which charities would get the money was a hotly disputed topic,
the additional $2.4 million designated as attorney fees was not. Id.
45. Matt Richmond, Coke Booted from Chicago Schools, THE JOURNAL STANDARD,
Nov. 15, 2004.
46. Id.
47. Id. See also Marguerite Higgins, Seattle School Board Targeted For Soda Pact,
WASHINGTON TIMES, July 19, 2003, at Al. The soft drink changes were not initiated by
warnings of lawsuits, Ms. Waldman said, adding that the school board is not worried about
obesity-related litigation. Id.
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its on junk food of some sort.4 8 These limitations seem to have had some
effect on children's beverage habits. The American Beverage Association
reports that the amount of non-diet soft drinks sold in United States schools
dropped more than 24% between 2002 and 2004.49 It is less than clear,
however, whether there has been a concomitant drop in obesity because the
majority of the replacement beverages were highly-sugared "sports" or
"fruit drinks." 50 And, as with all prohibition measures, the new rules have
spurred a healthy black market in unhealthy forbidden snacks.51 In sum,
while it is unclear to what extent new school regulations are affecting obe-
sity, it does seem that the litigation process has very little to do with the
trend. Such litigation is a ham-handed form of lobbying-a kind of lobby-
ing in which taxpayers foot the bill when attorneys' fees are demanded for
prevailing.
C. The Tobacco-Style Suits
With the ersatz obesity lawsuits out of the way, we come to the law-
suits that are of central concern-claims of personal injury based on eating
fattening food or claims of consumer fraud based on an alleged lack of suf-
ficient disclosure of the nutritional impact of junk food. The idea behind the
lawsuits is to achieve the same results for the vendors of unhealthy food as
for the vendors of cigarettes. 52 The attorneys behind this new wave of litiga-
tion plainly believe that the effect is more likely to sway public opinion in
the long run towards a favorable view of obesity litigation rather than an
unfavorable view of the tobacco litigation.53
The culmination of the tobacco litigation was the $246 billion settle-
ment over Medicaid reimbursement. 54 It is unclear what the settlement (of
48. J.M. Hirsch, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Dec. 1, 2005, available at
http://www.azcentral.com/health/kids/articles/1201 teensoda-ON.html (last visited Apr. 28,
2006).
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. E.g., Matthew Obernauer, Sweet Vending Victory at Austin High; Candy Ban
Spawns Black Market; Now Some Treats Have Returned, AUSTIN AMERICAN-STATESMAN,
Feb. 19, 2005, at Al; Anthony Ribaudo, R-Jeneration: Clandestine Candy Sales, LAS VEGAS
REVIEW-JOURNAL, Feb. 22, 2005, at 53; Anne Ryman, Senate OKs Junk-Food Ban; Prohibi-
tion on Daytime Sales Wouldn't Apply to High Schools, THE ARIZONA REPUBLIC, Apr. 15,
2005, at 1A; Jennifer Obakhume, Junk Food Goes Underground in California Schools, NPR
MORNING EDITION, Nov. 7, 2005.
52. See Olson supra note 5.
53. Warner, supra note 10 ("Professor Banzhaf acknowledges that public opinion is not
currently in favor of obesity litigation. But he added that the situation for tobacco was similar
15 years ago when people began suing cigarette companies for making smokers sick.")
54. For a comprehensive examination of the tobacco settlement, see MARTHA
DERTHICK, Up IN SMOKE: FROM LEGISLATION TO LITIGATION IN TOBACCO POLITICS, (CQ Press
2006]
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questionable constitutionality) 55 did for public health.56 The main effects
appear to be the creation of a cartel of tobacco companies and the estab-
lishment of a regressive tax on tobacco consumers with a significant portion
of the funds ending up in the pockets of trial lawyers. 7 The possibility of a
future lottery payout of billions of dollars in fees has encouraged attorneys
to start building an obesity case now through class actions.
As of the beginning of 2006, these cases have been more hypothetical
than real: two class actions against fast food restaurants in New York, 58 and
a threatened but still-unfiled Massachusetts class action against soda manu-
facturers. 59 Of the two filed cases, one was abandoned, 60 and the other was
saved only by an erroneous court ruling on a technical procedural issue.6 1
Each of the cases, however, have fatal flaws that make their underlying the-
ory both bad law and bad public policy.
62
1. Barber and Pelman
On July 23, 2002, Caesar Barber sued McDonald's Corp., Burger King
Corp., KFC Corp., and Wendy's International, Inc. in New York state court
in Bronx County.63 Caesar, a 270 pound fifty-six year old, alleged that the
fast food restaurants were responsible for his and the class members' poor
health.64 In the face of poor public reaction, Barber's attorneys put his case
on hold and adopted a new strategy of singling out one restaurant and using
children as plaintiffs.65
That suit, Pelman v. McDonald's,66 was also filed in Bronx County and
removed to federal court in the Southern District of New York.67 At first,
2002).
55. E.g., Michael Greve, How To Think About Constitutional Change, Part II, AEI
FEDERALIST OUTLOOK, Aug. 2, 2005, available at
http://www.aei.org/publications/filter.allpublD.22942,filter.all/pub-detail.asp (last visited
May 1, 2006) (arguing that 1998 tobacco agreement violates Compact Clause).
56. For a brief discussion, see Michael Greve, Compacts and Collusion, AEI
FEDERALIST OUTLOOK, Apr. 1, 2002, available at
http://www.aei.org/publications/pubID. 13782/pub_detail.asp (last visited May 1, 2006).
57. Id.
58. See infra § II.C.I.
59. See infra § II.C.2.
60. See infra notes 63-65 and accompanying text.
61. See infra notes 66-91 and accompanying text.
62. See infra § II.C.3.
63. Ellen Sorokin, What's Eating Him? Obese Man Sues Fast-Food Chains for Health
Woes, WASHINGTON TIMES, July 27, 2002, at Al.
64. Id.
65. Bonnie Brewer Cavanaugh, Parents Sue McD, NATION'S RESTAURANT NEWS, Sept.
23, 2002, at 1.
66. No. 02 Civ. 7821, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15202, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 2, 2003)
("Pelman IF'), reversed and vacated in part by, 396 F.3d 508 (2d Cir. 2005) ("Pelman IX1).
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the plaintiffs alleged a full-fledged products liability case. 68 After this was
dismissed without prejudice,69 the amended complaint limited itself to alle-
gations of personal injury on grounds of violations of the New York Con-
sumer Protection Act 70 and failure to warn. 7' The plaintiffs dropped their
failure to warn allegations before oral argument, and Judge Sweet dismissed
the remainder of the amended complaint with prejudice.72
To bring a Consumer Protection Act claim in New York, a plaintiff
"must show that the defendant's 'material deceptive act' caused the in-
jury., 73 The causation requirement is distinct from a reliance requirement,
which the trial court acknowledged that the plaintiffs had barely alleged.74
Rather, the trial court held that the plaintiffs failed to adequately allege that
the supposed fraud had caused their injuries.75 Without a particularized ex-
planation of causation, the complaint was insufficient.76
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit vacated and
remanded. 77 Its holding-which led to a significant substantive result-
rested on a technical, procedural issue. The court held that a consumer fraud
claim under Section 349 of the New York General Business Law was not an
"averment of fraud" and, thus, did not need to be stated with particularity
under Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.78 Because the
complaint met the bare-bones requirement of Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure 79 by simply alleging injury from a violation of the
statute, the Second Circuit held that dismissal was inappropriate.80
How did the Second Circuit come to the conclusion that an averment
of consumer fraud was not an "averment of fraud"? The court's only sup-
port for this certainly counterintuitive proposition was a tortured extension
67. Pelman v. McDonald's Corp., 237 F.Supp. 2d 512, 519 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) ("Pel-
man 1").
68. Id. at 520.
69. Id.
70. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW §§ 349, 350 (Consol. 2005).
71. Pelman II, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15202, at *5.
72. Id. at *5-6.
73. Id. at *27 (quoting Stutman v. Chemical Bank, 95 N.Y.2d 24, 29 (N.Y. 2000)).
74. Id. at *27-*28.
75. Id. at *30. The trial court also dismissed the individual claims of the parent co-
plaintiffs as time-barred. Id. at * 18. The plaintiffs did not appeal this decision. See Pelman
VI, 396 F.3d at 508.
76. Id. at *41.
77. Pelman Il, 396 F.3d at 512.
78. Id. at 511. "In all averments of fraud or mistake, the circumstances constituting
fraud or mistake shall be stated with particularity." FED. R. Civ. P. 9(b).
79. "A pleading which sets forth a claim for relief.. .shall contain.. .a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief . FED. R. CIV. P.
8(a)(2).
80. Pelman I. 396 F.3d at 512.
2006]
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of two Supreme Court cases, Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intel-
ligence and Coordination Unit81 and Swierkiewicz v. Sorema.82 Leatherman
and Swierkiewicz merely held that Rules 8 and 9 mean what they say and
that a short and plain statement of relief is all that is required if Rule 9(b)
does not require particularity.83 Thus, the Supreme Court ruled, it was inap-
propriate to require a heightened standard of pleading for a Section 1983
action84 or a Title VII action.85 But neither case-nor any appellate court-
has construed Rule 9(b) as narrowly as it was interpreted in Pelman IlL The
Second Circuit extended these straightforward Supreme Court holdings to
rule that because Section 349 claims require no showing of reliance, New
York's "consumer fraud" statute was not an "averment of fraud;" therefore,
the more lenient Rule 8 pleading standard applied.86
But Rule 9(b) hardly means that it applies only to common-law and not
statutory, fraud. Courts regularly and consistently understand Rule 9(b) to
apply in numerous statutory contexts. For example, numerous cases hold
that "securities fraud," while different from "fraud," is a claim that "sounds
in fraud," and, thus, must meet the Rule 9(b) requirements.87 The New York
consumer fraud laws "sound in fraud," and, thus, require Rule 9(b) pleading
with particularity; thus, the failure of Pelman to meet that standard should
have resulted in the Second Circuit's affirmance of the dismissal.88 No court
has held otherwise with respect to any other state's consumer fraud laws,
even though other states have similarly broad consumer fraud laws that pur-
port to disclaim the need to show reliance.89
81. 507 U.S. 163 (1993) (holding that § 1983 action is not a fraud action and need not
be pleaded with particularity).
82. 534 U.S. 506 (2002) (holding that a Title VII action need not be pleaded with par-
ticularity).
83. Leatherman, 507 U.S. at 168; Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 514-15.
84. Leatherman, 507 U.S. at 168.
85. Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 514-15.
86. Pelman I, 396 F.3d at 511.
87. E.g., Lone Star Ladies Inv. Club v. Schlotzsky's Inc., 238 F.3d 363, 368 (5th Cir.
2001); Anderson v. Clow (In re Stac Elecs. Sec. Litig.), 89 F.3d 1399, 1404-05 (9th Cir.
1996); Shapiro v. UJB Fin. Corp., 964 F.2d 272, 288 (3d Cir. 1992); Sears v. Likens, 912
F.2d 889, 892-93 (7th Cir. 1990). See also Williamson v. Allstate Ins. Co., 204 F.R.D. 641,
643-44 (D. Ariz. 2001) (consumer fraud).
88. Although the Supreme Court's decision in Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo,
544 U.S. 336 (2005) leaves open the question of whether Rule 9(b) applies to the causation
element of fraud claims in securities fraud cases, Second Circuit precedent does require a
particularized showing of causation. E.g., Decker v. Massey-Ferguson, Ltd., 681 F.2d 111,
120 (2d Cir. 1982); In re Merrill Lynch Tyco Research Sec. Litig., No. 03 CV 4080, 2004
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2247, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Feb 18, 2004).
89. E.g., Vess v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 317 F.3d 1097, 1108 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that
although fraud "is not an essential element" of CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17200 and al-
though the complaint did not use the word "fraud," the underlying allegations against two
defendants were grounded in fraud; thus, they had to comply with Rule 9(b)'s heightened
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Under Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a bald allegation
is enough to survive a motion to dismiss, and because Pelman met this more
lenient standard, his case briefly remains alive under the Second Circuit's
misguided view.90 While Judge Sweet's earlier rulings indicate that he is
unlikely to countenance intrusive discovery motions that would permit
plaintiffs to engage in discovery fishing expeditions, 91 the Second Circuit's
decision permits future plaintiffs to shop for a judge who will allow such
discovery, free from the constraints of the requirement of a plausible theory
of liability or causation in a complaint.
2. The Next Generation: Soda Suits
As 2006 began, the Public Health Advocacy Institute was threatening,
but had not yet brought, a class action against soft drink companies for mar-
keting and selling soda to children on grounds of "attractive nuisance" and
violating Massachusetts's broad consumer fraud laws.92 The institute's
strategy appears to be to create a wedge issue where popular opposition to
obesity litigation is not quite as strong by targeting soda machines in
schools and other marketing.
93
Suing on the attractive nuisance theory would be an abuse of the doc-
trine. First, it is analogous to the absurd suggestion that refrigerator and
swimming pool manufacturers should be liable when a landowner abandons
a refrigerator or leaves an unfenced swimming pool where children can play
in it and harm themselves. Second, there is no precedent for the idea that a
commercial transaction can be an attractive nuisance. The concept has dan-
gerous implications: why stop with soda? Why is selling soda an attractive
nuisance, but selling baseball bats or books about UFOs or Internet connec-
tivity is not? Are all commercial transactions with seventeen year olds to be
barred?
The soda suits, along with the fast-food suits, also suffer from a fun-
damental problem of causation. Many factors other than diet contribute to
obesity.94 Weight gain comes not just from excess calories, but also from
pleading standard).
90. Pelman IIl, 396 F.3d at 512.
91. Pelman I and Pelman II were both highly critical of plaintiffs' theory of causation.
A summary judgment motion by McDonald's on the causation element will require only
discovery of the plaintiffs, and McDonald's will likely be able to successfully request the
court to bifurcate discovery on this issue.
92. MASS. GEN. LAWS. ch. 93A; Michael Blanding, Hard on Soft Drinks, B. GLOBE, Oct.
30, 2005, at 24; Caroline E. Mayer, Lawyers Ready Suit Over Soda, WASH. POST, Dec. 2,
2005 at D2.
93. See Blanding, supra note 92, at 24.
94. NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF HEALTH, CLINICAL GUIDELINES ON THE IDENTIFICATION,
EVALUATION, AND TREATMENT OF OVERWEIGHT AND OBESITY IN ADULTS, at xi, 27 (1998)
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inadequate exercise. 95 Simple labor-saving devices can therefore result in
weight gain. For example, a 150-pound person who replaces six minutes a
day of manual dish-washing with using an electric dish-washer and watch-
ing additional television instead with the time saved, is burning ten fewer
calories a day, which adds up to an extra pound a year in weight gain if that
person does not substitute additional exercise elsewhere.9 6 Someone who
spends an hour reading articles about obesity litigation in the UALR Law
Review or watching Buffy the Vampire Slayer has the same differential in
calories consumed and burned as someone who spent that hour walking at
brisk pace but also ate a candy bar or drank a can of Mr. Pibb.97 (One looks
forward to the suits against the University of Arkansas at Little Rock for
their contribution to the obesity problem for their role in publishing this
reading material.) There is also a significant genetic component.98 Finally,
weight loss is a feasible option for those who set their minds on it.99
Attorneys perhaps hope to target children's advertising. Nevertheless,
advertising is not a proximate cause of obesity in the simple way that plain-
tiffs' briefs would have to suggest. Advertisers cannot force consumers to
available at http://www.nhlbi.nih.gov/guidelines/obesity/obgains.pdf (last visited May 1,
2006) (stating that "Obesity is a complex multifactoral chronic disease developing from
interactive influences of numerous factors-social, behavioral, physiological, metabolic,
cellular, and molecular" in addition to cultural and genetic factors); UNITED STATES DEP'T OF
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., The Surgeon General's Call to Action to Prevent and Decrease
Overweight and Obesity, at 1 (2001) available at
http://www.surgeongeneral.gov/topics/obesity/call toaction/CalltoAction.pdf (last visited
May 1, 2006) (stating that "Overweight and obesity are caused by many factors. For each
individual, body weight is determined by a combination of genetic, metabolic, behavioral,
environmental, cultural, and socioeconomic influences.").
95. James 0. Hill et al., Obesity and the Environment: Where Do We Go from Here?
299 Sci. 853, 854 (2003) (noting that 3500-calorie surplus of calories ingested and stored
over calories exerted equals 1 pound of weight-gain).
96. According to calorie-count.com, washing dishes bums 168 calories/hour, while
watching television while sitting burns 68 calories/hour. CALORIE-COUNT DATABASE, Activity
Browser, available at http://www.caloriecount.com/calories/activities/7.html (last visited
May 1, 2006). For a discussion of the general trend, see Tomas J. Philipson & Richard A.
Posner, The Long-Run Growth in Obesity as a Function of Technological Change (Univer-
sity of Chicago Law School, John M. Olin Law & Economics Working Paper No. 78) May
1999, available at http://papers.ssm.com/paper.tafabstractid= 167008.
97. This observation is based on a similar one by Thomas Haynes. Thomas Haynes,
Who Is to Blame for Obesity, Panel Discussion at the American Enterprise Institute for Pub-
lic Policy Research Conference (Mar. 3, 2005), available at
http://www.aei.org/events/filter.all,eventlD. 1024/transcrip.asp (last visited May 1, 2006).
98. See supra, note 94.
99. Of course, the health problems ascribed to tobacco in the Medicaid reimbursement
suits also have multiple causes, and millions of people, about half of all American smokers,
have voluntarily quit smoking. See UNITED STATES DEP'T OF HEALTH & HuMAN SERVS., The
Health Benefits of Smoking Cessation: A Report of the Surgeon General 593-94 tbl.4 Pub.
No. (CDC) 90-814 (1990).
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purchase what they do not desire, or we would all be drinking New Coke,
Crystal Pepsi, and Zima. 00 As Todd Zywicki has noted, the worldwide
trend of increasing obesity is similar to that of the United States, be it Bra-
zil, Haiti, Ghana, Morocco, or Egypt, and there is no reason to think that
"Al-Jazeera is awash in Cocoa Pebbles ads."''1 1
3. The Fatal Flaws of Obesity Suits
There are two dangerous problems with the obesity class actions, each
of which is an attempt by the plaintiffs' bar to avoid the likely fatal issue of
causation. First is the very nature of the class action. A class action is meant
to address groups of suits where the common issues predominate. 0 2 Be-
cause of the individualized issues of causation discussed above, obesity
litigation is inappropriate for the class-action context. Nevertheless, some
judges let the tail wag the dog; class actions are regularly certified when the
individualized issues predominate, simply by structuring a trial plan in
which the individualized issues are not tried at all. 10 3 This is inappropriate,
but it happens often enough that it is a risk for "Big Food." With billions of
dollars at stake, the defendants must win every suit, while the plaintiffs need
win only one out of a hundred. A class certification is often enough to pro-
voke a settlement for billions.' 4
100. Indeed, my own obesity is in spite of the fact that my parents steadfastly refused to
purchase heavily sugared cereals such as Lucky Charms and Count Chocula, not withstand-
ing my entreaties to the contrary. Even Sherri Carlson, the lead plaintiff in a proposed (but,
as of March 2006, still unfiled) lawsuit against Viacom and Kellogg's over alleged consumer
fraud in cereal advertising admits that she has withstood her children's request for cereals she
finds insufficiently nutritious, but still seeks billions of dollars of damage for the supposed
insult. Press Release, Center for Science in the Public Interest (Jan. 18, 2006). The Carl-
son/CSPI suit suffers from the same problems as the Pelman-style suits, with the additional
problem that even the lead plaintiff cannot even be said to have suffered cognizable injury.
See Section III.C.3, infra.
101. Todd Zywicki, Who Is to Blame for Obesity, Panel Discussion at the American
Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research Conference (Mar. 3, 2005) available at
http://www.aei.org/events/filter.all,eventlD.1024/transcript.asp (last visited May 1, 2006).
See also Timothy J. Muris, Don't Blame TV, WALL ST. J., Jun. 25, 2004, at AI0 (stating that
"Even our dogs and cats are fat, and it is not because they are watching too much advertis-
ing.")
102. See supra note 2.
103. E.g., Dukes v. Wal-Mart, Inc., 222 F.R.D. 189 (N.D. Cal. 2004). See generally
Epstein, supra note 2, at 512-14.
104. E.g., Shaw v. Toshiba Am. Info. Sys. Inc., 91 F. Supp. 2d 926 (E.D. Tex. 1999);
Andy Pasztor & Peter Landers, Toshiba to Pay $2B Settlement on Laptops, ZDNet.com, Oct.
31, 1999, available at http://news.zdnet.com/2100-9595_22-516294.html (last visited Feb. 8,
2005) ($2.1 billion settlement). See generally MICHAEL GREVE, HARM-LEss LAWSUITS?:
WHAT'S WRONG WITH CONSUMER CLASS ACTIONS (2005).
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Second is the increasing breadth of state consumer fraud law; more and
more, state law permits recovery when there has been no tangible injury,
merely by virtue of the defendant's alleged bad behavior. 10 5 In cases such as
Price v. Philip Morris, Inc. 106 and Desiano v. Warner-Lambert,'0 7 plaintiffs
allege material and misleading omissions in advertising and claim that they
are entitled to damages to provide the benefit of the bargain. 10 8 In Price, it
turned out through expert testimony that, by coincidence, the value of the
benefit of the bargain from the alleged misrepresentation was supposedly
over 90% of the amount paid, requiring nearly an entire refund for "com-
pensatory" damages. 109
These remote, but all-too-plausible, risks of absurd results have pro-
voked the so-called "cheeseburger bills" in state legislatures and in Con-
gress." 1 0 Protection of a single industry against a single set of ludicrous legal
theories is a worthy goal. On the other hand, the ability of the plaintiffs' bar
to threaten restaurateurs and junk-food sellers comes, not from the power of
their theory of obesity liability, but from the too-real possibility of abuse of
the conjunction of the consumer fraud laws and the class-action mechanism
to blackmail a defendant into settling a case rather than risk the small
chance of a bankrupting judgment."' The problems "Big Food" faces are
the same problems faced by American business in general. The real solution
to the illegitimate litigation discussed in this essay is not gerrymandering
the tort laws to provide protection for individual industries with effective
105. GREVE, supra note 104.
106. No. 00-L- 112, 2003 WL 22597608 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Mar. 21, 2003) ("Price F'), rev'd,
No. 96326, 2005 WL 3434368 (Ill. Dec. 15, 2005).
107. 326 F.3d 339 (2d Cir. 2003).
108. See GREVE supra note 104, at 21. In the threatened Massachusetts Carlson/CSPI
suit, the plaintiff claims to be injured from seeing the commercial, rather than from buying
the product, and seeks a $25 penalty for each viewing. Id.
109. Price's $10.1 billion damages award was based in part on a finding that the dimuni-
tion in value of light cigarettes because of the "fraud" was 92.3%. GREVE, supra, note 104.
The judge was not deterred in his finding by the continued successful purchase of light ciga-
rettes by the vast majority of the class at today's prices, considerably higher than they were
during the class period, despite the fact that the "fraud" had been exposed. Price, 2005 WL
3434368 at *55 (Karmeier, J., concurring).
110. E.g., H-R 109-554, Personal Responsibility in Food Consumption Act of 2005. The
bill's history is discussed by one of its champions, The Center for Consumer Freedom, at
http://www.consumerfreedom.com/newsdetail.cfm/headline/2903 (last visited May 1,
2006).
111. See In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 288 F.3d 1012, 1015-16 (7th Cir. 2003); West
v. Prudential Securities, Inc., 282 F.3d 935, 937 (7th Cir. 2002); Szabo v. Bridgeport Ma-
chines, Inc., 249 F.3d 672, 675 (7th Cir. 2001); In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc., 51 F.3d
1293, 1299-1300 (7th Cir. 1995); HENRY J. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A GENERAL
VIEW 120 (1973); see also Milton Handler, The Shift from Substantive to Procedural Innova-
tions in Antitrust Suits-The Twenty-Third Annual Antitrust Review, 71 COLuM. L. REV. 1, 9
(1971); Epstein, supra note 2.
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lobbies but rather meaningful class action and civil justice reform that pro-
hibits actions being brought without tangible injury and that enforces the
certification standards to protect the due process rights of defendants from
such abuses." 2 Nibbling away at class-action abuse through cheeseburger
bills rather than establishing comprehensive reforms merely shifts the bat-
tleground to other industries that may not have sufficient political power to
receive legislative protection from the litigation lobby."
3
112. See, e.g. Richard A. Epstein, Class Actions: Aggregation, Amplification, and Distor-
tion, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 475 (2003); GREvE, supra, note 104.
113. Cf Walter Olson, The Lawsuit Lobby, AMERICAN SPECTATOR (Mar.-Apr. 2003)
(documenting political power of plaintiffs' bar).
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